WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: RECOVERY OF BENEFITS
UNDER THE DUAL PURPOSE DOCTRINE
RECOVERY under workmen's compensation is limited to injuries incurred "in the course of employment." One of the most troublesome
facets of this litigious phrase arises when an injury is incurred on a trip
made for both business and personal reasons, commonly referred to as a
dual purpose trip.
In Corley v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n,' the Supreme Court of
South Carolina was confronted with the problem of the correct interpretation and application of the dual purpose doctrine in determining
whether a fatal injury to an employee of the defendant was incurred
"in the course of employment." Decedent, a field agent of defendant,
invited two friends to accompany him to the state capital to attend a
football game, explaining to them that he had to transact some official
business before the game. After their arrival, the decedent and his
friends went to the football stadium, where the decedent had prearranged a meeting with a state senator who was from the same town
as the decedent. However, the two men agreed to postpone their meeting until after they had returned home the next day. Decedent then
went to the football game. While returning to his home on the morning
after the game, the decedent was killed in a collision with a truck.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina denied compensation to the
decedent's wife on the ground that the trip was made for the decedent's
personal pleasure. 2 'The court held that the meeting with the senator
did not necessitate the trip. Emphasizing that both men were from the
same town," the court concluded that if the football game had been
canceled, the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the
evidence was that the decedent would not have made the trip. In so
holding, the court adopted the lucid formula expounded by Judge
Cardozo in Marks' Dependents v. Gray4 and correctly applied the test
to the fact situation presented.
2

117 S.E.zd 577 (S.C. i96o).
In so holding the court overruled the Industrial Commission's finding that the

decedent's work necessitated the journey.
'The court also pointed out that the senator stated that the matter he wished to
discuss with decedent was of a local nature, and so far as he knew involved nothing requiring a trip to the state capital. 117 S.E.2d at 58z.
. 251 N.Y. 9 o, 167 N.E. 181 (.9-9).
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In the Marks case, a plumber's helper who was going to drive to a
neighboring town to meet his wife was asked by his employer to repair
some plumbing in that town. The work would not have justified a
special trip for the sole purpose of repairing the plumbing. Shortly
after starting on his trip, the employee was fatally injured in an automobile accident. The court denied compensation, Cardozo stating:5
We do not say that service to the employer must be the sole cause of the
journey, but at least it must be a concurrent cause. To establish liability, the
inference must be permissible that the trip would have been made though the
private errand had been canceled ....
The test in brief is this: If the work
of the employee creates a necessity for travel, he is in the course of his employment, though he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own ....
If, however, the work has had no part in creating the necessity for travel,
if the journey would have gone forward though the business errand had been
dropped, and would have been canceled upon failure of the private purpose,
though the business errand was undone, the travel is then personal, and
personal the risk.

Some courts, although purporting to follow the Marks rule, have interpreted Cardozo's test to be one of dominant or principal purpose.'
The case of Butler v. Nolde Bros., InC. 7 is illustrative of this interpretation. The decedent, a route salesman, was fatally injured on a dual
purpose trip. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, although
purporting to adopt the Marks test, denied compensation, stating that
the decedent's fatal injury was incurred on a trip "for the principal
purpose of a social visit with his friends . . . and with the incidental
purpose of collecting from them for deliveries ... previously made.""
'I.

at 93, 167 N.E. at 183. The Marks approach has been adopted by approxiI LARSON, WORK-MEN's COMPENSATION 242 n.27 (195).
A good example of a case in which the Marks test was applied to allow compensation is Irwin-Neisler & Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 346 Ill. 89, 178 N.E. 357 (1931).
In that case an employee who was about to leave for a vacation was asked by his
employer to stop on his way back and make a study of why a product was not selling
well in a particular area. After his vacation had ended, the employee made the study.
While returning to his home, he was injured in a collision. In awarding compensation,
the court pointed out that if the employee had not made the investigation, someone else
would have been sent to do the same job. For further examples of decisions allowing
recovery under this test, see Dauphine v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 57 Cal. App. 2d 729,
109 P.2d 978 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941 ) 5 Levy v. Levy's Bazaar, 257 App. Div. 885, x2
N.Y.S.2d 131 (939)
Standard Oil Co. v. Smith, 56 Wyo. 537, 111 P.zd 132 (941).
'E.g., Pohler v. T. W. Snow Constr. Co., 239 Iowa 1o8, 33 N.W.2d 46 (1948);
Kaplan v. Alpha Epsilon Phi Sorority, 230 Minn. 547, 42 N.W.2d 342 (1950).
7 i89 Va. 932, 55 S.E.zd 36 (-949).
8
1d. at 943, 55 S.E.zd at 41.

mately one-half the states.
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The court did not adequately consider the question of whether the trip
would have been made if the social visit had been canceled?
The dominant or principal purpose formulation is an inaccurate and
undesirable interpretation of the Marks rule. Cardozo, in expounding
this rule, specifically stated that an injury incurred on a trip of which
a business purpose was a concurrent cause is compensable. He defined
concurrent cause as a cause which would have necessitated making the
trip even if the personal objective was no longer present. This formulation, correctly applied, does not require that the motives of the employee
be weighed for the purpose of ascertaining the most important or compelling cause of the journey. Yet, under the dominant purpose construction, the court must apply this highly subjective test in determining if
the injury is compensable.
Other courts have adopted the "no nice inquiry" approach to the
dual purpose problem. 10 Under this rule, "it is enough that there was
a concurrent business and personal motive and no nice inquiry will be
made to determine the relative importance of each." 1 It is apparent
that some courts have adopted this approach as a reaction against the
dominant or principal purpose interpretation of the Marks test. For
example, in Cook v. Highway Cas. Co.,12 the Supreme Court of Florida,
in adopting the "no nice inquiry" rule, stated:'3
[T]he decisions of those courts which do not require the Commission to
weigh the business and personal motives and determine which is the dominant
' The court indicated that although there was a business purpose, the business was
such that it could have been accomplished equally as well at the time when decedent
normally transacted such business. Since the business could have been done at another
time the court concluded that the trip on which decedent was fatally injured was "more
of a personal than a business nature." Id. at 942, 55 S.E.2d at 41. However, as is
pointed out in i LARSON, op. cit. supra note 5, at 244, "[I]t is not necessary, under
this formula, that, on failure of the personal motive, the business trip would have been
taken by this particular employee at this partictlar time. It is enough that someone
sometime would have had to take the trip to carry out the business mission. Perhaps
another employee would have done it; perhaps another time would have been chosen;
but if the trip would ultimately have had to be made, and if the employer got this
necessary item of travel accomplished by combining it with his employee's personal
trip, it is accurate to say that it was a concurrent cause of the trip, rather than an incidental appendage or afterthought."
10 See Phoenix Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 31 Cal. 2d 856, 193 P.2d

745 (1948); Cook v. Highway Cas. Co., 82 So. 2d 679 (Fla. '949); Brookhaven
Steam Laundry v. Watts, 214 Miss. 569, 55 So. 2d 382 (1951); Talent v. M. C. Lyle

& Son, 187 Tenn. 482, 2x6 S.W.2d 7 (948).
11 5 NACCA L.J. 61, 64 (295o).

1 8z So. ad 679 (Fla.

'old. at 682.

1955).
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or compelling cause of the trip, are more consistent with the remedial purposes
of our workmen's compensation act than is the more stringent rule of Marks'
Dependents v. Gray . . . and we agree . . . that " 'no nice inquiry' wil be
made to determine the relative importance" of a concurrent business and
personal motive.

The "no nice inquiry" approach, to the extent that it eliminates the
weighing of motives, is consistent with the Marks rule. However, one
authority has perceptively noted that this approach "supplies no positive
test with which to solve the many close questions that are constantly
arising.' 4 The "no nice inquiry" rule is, in effect, an abandonment of
any attempt to circumscribe the applicability of workmen's compensation; conceivably, it would allow recovery even if the business purpose
were infinitesimal.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina is to be commended for
adopting the correct interpretation of the Marks rule.'"
Properly
applied, this test establishes workable limitations and, at the same time,
furthers the humanitarian purpose of workmen's compensation."0 In
order to conform to this purpose, the applicable statutory provisions
should be liberally construed1 7 the Marks approach is sufficiently
LARSON, op. cit. supra note 5, at 5o.
Of course it may be argued that the Marks test establishes an arbitrary cutoff
point for compenstation. However, the fixing of boundaries of protection involves basic
policy considerations that defy hard and fast rules. No matter how far the boundaries
of protection are extended, there always will be troublesome borderline cases in which
ultimate results will require balancing of conflicting interests. The cutoff point established by the Marks case is certainly no more arbitrary than any other cutoff point that
might be established.
"oWorkmen's Compensation is a branch of social insurance designed to protect
workers from a substandard level of life, resulting from a disabling work injury, by
facilitating the recovery of compensation. The need for this type of legislation grew
14 i

z

out of the fact that the rules which governed employment-connected injuries prior to

workmen's compensation "were predicated on notions of fault and dismally failed to
protect the injured workmen." Riensenfeld, Forty Years of American Workmen's
Compensation, 7 NACCA LJ. 15, 1 7 (195 ).
"7 Accord, Clark v. Village of Hemingford, 147 Neb. 1044, z6 N.W.zd 15 6947)
Sligh v. Pacific Mills, 207 S.C. 316, 35 S.E.zd 713 (1945) i Wilkins v. BlanchardMcDonald Lumber Co., 115 Vt. 89, 52 A.2d 781 (x94.7). See generally, HoRovIrz,
CURRENT TRENDS IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 470-72

(1947),

where he points

out:
"[C]ompensation laws were enacted as a humanitarian measure, to create a new
type liability-liability without fault-to make the industry that was responsible
for the injury bear a major part of the burdens resulting therefrom. It was a
revolt from the old common law and creation of a complete substitute therefor....
It meant to make liability dependent on a relationship to the job, in a liberal,
humane fashion, with litigation reduced to a minimum. It meant to cut out the
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broad to effectuate this objective. Since this test is more consistent with
the remedial purpose of workmen's compensation acts than is either the
dominant purpose interpretation or "no nice inquiry" approach, it
should not be distorted by inaccurate interpretation.' 8
narrow common law methods of denying awards.
"The early cases tended to be strict5 but the later and modern trend was and is
to construe the acts broadly and liberally, to protect the interests of the injured
worker and his dependents."
"8An excellent discussion of the dual purpose doctrine is found in i LARSON, Op.
cit. supra note 5, at § M8.

